Key points
- The Michigan Supreme Court held in Grand Rapids v Impens (1982) that store security not acting at police instigation or with police help need not give Miranda warnings.[1]
- Constitutional protections restrain government action, so store staff acting on their own are treated as private individuals.[1]
- Security guards working in close connection with police may be acting under color of state law and subject to constitutional limits.[1]
- The Court of Appeals held in 1978 that the Fourth Amendment does not govern searches by private security guards who are not acting under color of law.[2]
- A statement made to store staff and offered against the person who made it is defined as not hearsay, but involuntary statements can still be challenged.[3][4]
The Fourth Amendment's limits on searches and the Miranda warning requirement restrain government officers, not private persons.[1] When store loss-prevention staff act on their own, without police instigation or help, Michigan courts treat them as private individuals: the Michigan Supreme Court held that statements made to such staff need not be preceded by Miranda warnings, and the Court of Appeals held that the Fourth Amendment does not govern their searches.[1][2] That changes when guards work in close connection with police.[1]
This page explains those rules and how statements made to store staff are treated in court. The store's power to stop and hold someone is covered on the page about what a store may do. It describes the law as courts have stated it. It does not advise anyone whether to answer questions, sign a statement, or agree to a search.
Why constitutional rules usually do not reach store staff
In Grand Rapids v Impens (1982) the Michigan Supreme Court explained that constitutional protections apply only to governmental action, so a person who is not a police officer, and is not acting in concert with or at the request of police, is not required to give constitutional warnings before eliciting an incriminating statement.[1] The Court quoted that rule from People v Omell, a 1968 Court of Appeals case holding that private investigators hired by an employer to look into a cash shortage did not have to give constitutional warnings before the branch manager wrote a confession letter.[5][6]
Impens itself arose from a store stop: detectives took three men to a security office, searched them, had them sign a "Loss Prevention Department Voluntary Statement," and called police, who issued appearance tickets.[1] The Court held the statements were admissible without Miranda warnings because the security staff did not act at police instigation and worked without police assistance or cooperation.[1] Two justices dissented and would have required warnings for custodial questioning by private guards, but the majority rule controls.[7]
When store security acts with police
Impens recognized that private guards who receive direct help from police, or who work in close connection with them, may be acting under color of state law and subject to constitutional restrictions; it found no such link where the guards served only their employer's interest and there was "no complicity" with police.[1] The Court also held:
- Licensing is not state action. The mere licensing of security guards is not enough government involvement to require Miranda warnings.[1]
- An off-duty officer's limited role. The presence of an off-duty deputy from another jurisdiction, who did not take the statement and identified himself as a store employee, did not change the result.[1]
Once police officers themselves question a person, the ordinary Miranda rules apply; see when police are called. Miranda warnings attach to "custodial interrogation," meaning questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in a significant way.[8] Michigan courts decide custody by asking whether a reasonable person would have felt free to end the questioning and leave, and whether the setting carries the same coercive pressures as station-house questioning.[9] A child's age, if known to the officer or objectively apparent, is part of that analysis.[10] For police questioning generally, the drug crimes guide has a page on Miranda rights.
Searches of bags, pockets and purses
In People v Holloway (1978), a drugstore guard patted down a suspected shoplifter and found a pistol; the Court of Appeals held the Fourth Amendment's restraint on government searches does not extend to private security guards and reversed the trial court's ruling.[2] Holloway was decided before November 1, 1990, so it does not bind later Court of Appeals panels the way newer published decisions do, but the Michigan Supreme Court relied on it in Impens.[11][12]
Other rules shape what happens to a person's belongings during a stop:
- Agreeing to an inspection. In Bonkowski v Arlan's Department Store, a shopper returned to the store and agreed to let a guard look in her purse; the Court found no arrest because there was no proof the guard intended to take her into custody.[13][14]
- Keeping a purse or bag. In Clarke v K mart Corp, the Court of Appeals applied the rule that a store owner who, without privilege, keeps a customer's purse so that she reasonably believes she can leave only by giving it up has confined her.[15]
- Items taken at arrest. MCL 764.25 says any person making an arrest must take offensive weapons or incriminating articles from the arrested person and deliver them to the sheriff, chief of police or magistrate.[16] The section's text does not say how far, if at all, it allows a private person to search, and no Michigan decision applying it to store staff was found for this guide.
- Licensed private security police. These officers have police-style warrantless arrest power on the employer's premises during working hours and in full uniform.[17] A 1976 Court of Appeals panel said it was "inclined to agree" that people searched by such officers should have the same constitutional protection as with police, but it did not decide the question.[18]
Can evidence from a store search be suppressed?
The exclusionary rule generally bars evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the Michigan Supreme Court has said it does not apply automatically even then: suppression turns on police culpability and whether exclusion would deter police misconduct.[19][20] In Impens the Supreme Court stated that "the exclusionary rule only applies if governmental involvement can be shown."[12] Both "it can never be suppressed" and "it always can" overstate the law: guards acting in concert with police may be treated as state actors, and a 1976 panel's suggestion about licensed security officers with police powers was not a decision.[1][18]
A private search that falls outside the Fourth Amendment is not beyond the law. Impens quoted Holloway's point that a person wronged by private citizens, security guards or not, can bring civil actions or file criminal complaints against them.[12] The civil side is covered on the page about false arrest and false imprisonment claims.
How statements to store staff are used in court
Under Michigan Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), a statement offered against a party that the party made, adopted, or authorized is defined as not hearsay.[3] That definition does not answer every question about a statement:
- Voluntariness. Impens quoted with approval the principle that the guarantee against self-incrimination prevents the state from using involuntary answers, whether obtained by government or private conduct.[4]
- Completeness. If one side introduces part of a written or recorded statement, such as part of a signed store form or part of a video, the other side may require other parts that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.[21]
- Corpus delicti. A confession may not be admitted unless independent evidence shows the specific injury and some criminal agency as its source.[22] The rule applies to confessions, not to statements admitting only some facts.[23]
- Silence with police. A prosecutor may not refer to a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence with police.[24]
The evidence page covers video, receipts and loss-prevention reports, and the page on defenses covers how these issues fit into a case.
Cameras and fitting rooms
Store surveillance has its own limits. Under MCL 750.539j it is a felony, punishable by up to 2 years for a first offense, to surveil a person clad only in undergarments, or a person's unclad genitals or buttocks or a female's unclad breasts, where the person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy; photographing or recording such images is a felony punishable by up to 5 years. The statute's only listed exceptions are security monitoring in a residence by its owner or principal occupant (unless done for a lewd purpose) and peace officers performing their duties.[25] Installing or using a device to observe or record in a "private place" without the consent of the people entitled to privacy there is also a felony, and a "private place" does not include a place to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access.[26] Whether a particular fitting room gives a reasonable expectation of privacy is a question of fact; no Michigan decision on store fitting-room surveillance was found for this guide.
Employees questioned by an employer
The same private-actor rule has been applied outside stores. In Omell the court held that private detectives hired by an employer to investigate a cash shortage did not have to give constitutional warnings before a branch manager wrote a confession letter.[6] Voluntariness remains a separate question.[4] See under investigation for theft or embezzlement and the page for an employee accused of embezzlement.
Common questions
Do store security guards have to read me my Miranda rights?
Not when they act on their own. In Grand Rapids v Impens the Michigan Supreme Court held that retail security staff who did not act at police instigation and worked without police assistance were private individuals, so statements made to them need not be preceded by Miranda warnings. The Court recognized that guards who work in close connection with police may be treated differently.[1]
Can loss prevention search my bag or pockets?
In People v Holloway the Court of Appeals held that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to searches by private security guards who are not acting under color of law. Civil law still applies. In Clarke v K mart the court applied the rule that keeping a customer's purse so she reasonably believes she cannot leave without it confines her.[2][15]
I signed a written statement for loss prevention. Can it be used against me?
A statement offered against the person who made it is defined as not hearsay under MRE 801(d)(2). That does not settle voluntariness, which can still be challenged, and a full confession needs independent evidence that a crime occurred before it can be admitted. If part of a written statement is introduced, the other side may require other parts that in fairness should be considered with it.[3][4][22][21]
Is it different if the guard is an off-duty police officer?
In Impens one store detective was an off-duty deputy sheriff from another jurisdiction. The Court held that his limited role, where he did not take the statement and identified himself as a store employee, was not enough to treat the guards as acting under color of law. The decision turned on those facts and did not decide what happens when an officer takes the statement himself.[1]
Can evidence found by store security be thrown out?
The answer depends on who acted. The Michigan Supreme Court stated in Impens that the exclusionary rule only applies if governmental involvement can be shown, and the Court of Appeals held in Holloway that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to searches by private guards not acting under color of law. Guards acting in concert with police may be treated as state actors, and a 1976 panel suggested, without deciding, that licensed security officers with police powers should be held to police standards.[12][2][1][18]
Sources
- Grand Rapids v Impens, 414 Mich 667 (1982) — Caselaw Access Project
- People v Holloway, 82 Mich App 629 (1978) — Caselaw Access Project
- MRE 801(d)(2)(A)-(D) — Michigan Courts
- Grand Rapids v Impens, 414 Mich 667 (1982) (quoting In re Deborah C, 30 Cal 3d 125, 132 (1981)) — Caselaw Access Project
- Grand Rapids v Impens, 414 Mich 667 (1982) (quoting People v Omell, 15 Mich App 154, 157 (1968)) — Caselaw Access Project
- People v Omell, 15 Mich App 154 (1968) — Caselaw Access Project
- Grand Rapids v Impens, 414 Mich 667 (1982) (Kavanagh, J., dissenting) — Caselaw Access Project
- Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444 (1966) — Michigan Courts
- People v Lewinski, ___ Mich App ___ (2024) — Michigan Courts
- JDB v North Carolina, 564 US 261, 264, 277 (2011) — Michigan Courts
- MCR 7.215(J)(1) — Michigan Courts
- Grand Rapids v Impens, 414 Mich 667 (1982) (quoting People v Holloway, 82 Mich App 629, 633 (1978)) — Caselaw Access Project
- Clarke v K mart Corp, 197 Mich App 541 (1992); Bonkowski v Arlan's Dep't Store, 383 Mich 90, 96-97 (1970) — Caselaw Access Project
- Bonkowski v Arlan's Dep't Store, 383 Mich 90 (1970) — Caselaw Access Project
- Clarke v K mart Corp, 197 Mich App 541 (1992) — Caselaw Access Project
- MCL 764.25 — Michigan Legislature
- MCL 338.1080 — Michigan Legislature
- People v Eastway, 67 Mich App 464 (1976) — Caselaw Access Project
- MJI Criminal Proceedings Benchbook Vol. 1, §11.9(A) (quoting In re Forfeiture of $176,598, 443 Mich 261, 265 (1993); Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961); People v Bogucki (2025)) — Michigan Courts
- MJI Criminal Proceedings Benchbook Vol. 1, §11.9(A) (quoting People v Lucynski (Lucynski III), ___ Mich ___ (2024)) — Michigan Courts
- MRE 106 — Michigan Courts
- People v Washington, 514 Mich 583, 605 (2024); People v Burns, 250 Mich App 436, 438 (2002) — Michigan Courts
- People v Washington, 514 Mich 583, 605-607 (2024) — Michigan Courts
- People v Clary, 494 Mich 260, 271 (2013) (citing Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610, 618-619 (1976)); People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 634 (2005) — Michigan Courts
- MCL 750.539j(1)-(2), (4)-(5) — Michigan Legislature
- MCL 750.539d(1)(a), (3)(a)(i); MCL 750.539a(1) — Michigan Legislature
This page is general legal information about Michigan law, published by the office of Attorney Shawn Haff. It is not legal advice and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws change and every case turns on its own facts — check the sources linked above and talk to a licensed Michigan attorney about your situation. In an emergency, call 911.