Key points
- The prosecutor has to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant is not required to prove innocence or to do anything.[1]
- Consent can be used as a defense to negate the elements of force or coercion; the benchbook for judges states it is inapplicable where the victim is under 16 or the offense requires proof of incapacity.[2][3][4]
- Rejected: Michigan does not recognize a reasonable-mistake-of-age defense in cases of statutory rape (People v Cash, 1984).[5]
- Entrapment is decided by the trial judge, not the jury, and the defendant bears the burden of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence.[6][7]
- Under MCL 768.37 the defendant's voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any crime; the one statutory exception is a medication defense to a specific intent crime that the defendant must prove.[8]
Michigan statutes, jury instructions and court decisions provide for some defenses to sex crime charges, limit others, and reject others. The starting point in every case is the same: a person accused of a crime is presumed innocent, the prosecutor must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant is not required to prove innocence or to do anything.[1]
This page is a map. It explains what the law says about each defense, who decides it and which side has to prove it, and links to the page that covers it in depth. Each row gives the authority it rests on, and a defense the cited authority rejects is labelled "Rejected."
This page explains the law. It is not legal advice, not a guide to strategy, and not a recommendation to rely on any defense; nothing here says which defense, if any, fits a particular case.
Defenses at a glance
| Defense or claim | What Michigan law says | Who decides, and whose burden | Full page |
|---|---|---|---|
| The prosecutor has not proved an element | If the prosecutor has not proven every element beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury must find the defendant not guilty.[9] | The fact-finder; the prosecutor's burden.[1][9] | What happens at a CSC trial |
| Consent | Limited. Can be utilized to negate the elements of force or coercion. The benchbook states it is inapplicable to offenses involving victims under 16, to offenses requiring proof of incapacity, and to the mental health professional provision. For provisions on complainants aged 16 or older defined by the actor's position, the sources state no rule.[2][3][4][10][11] | Jury, where there is evidence of consent; the benchbook states that once the defendant produces enough evidence to put consent in controversy, the prosecutor bears the burden of disproving it beyond a reasonable doubt.[12][13] | The consent defense |
| Mistake about age | Rejected. Michigan does not recognize a reasonable-mistake-of-age defense in cases of statutory rape (People v Cash, Michigan Supreme Court, 1984).[5] | Not applicable; the Court said the actual, not the apparent, age of the complainant governs.[14] | Mistake of age is not a defense |
| Mistake about mental or physical condition | Limited. Applies only where the statutory language requires that the actor knows or has reason to know of the condition; a defendant who makes a reasonable mistake may not be criminally liable.[15] | Judged by a reasonable-person, objective standard, not the defendant's subjective perception.[16] | Incapacitation, intoxication and consent |
| The allegation is untrue | Not a separate defense in the sources; witness credibility is a question for the fact-finder.[17] | The fact-finder; the prosecutor's burden. Under MRE 607 any party may attack a witness's credibility, within the limits of the rules of evidence and the rape-shield statute.[18][19] | False allegations and credibility |
| Identity or alibi | The prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was actually there; the defendant does not have to prove he or she was somewhere else.[20] | Jury; the prosecutor's burden. A defendant in a felony case who proposes to offer alibi testimony files written notice.[20][21] | Identity, alibi and DNA |
| Entrapment | A two-prong, modified objective test focused on police conduct; a defendant is entitled to dismissal of charges if either prong is satisfied (People v Jade, July 31, 2026).[22][23] | Trial judge, at a separate evidentiary hearing; the defendant's burden by a preponderance of the evidence.[7][6] | Entrapment in sting cases |
| Statute of limitations | Depends on the offense and its date. An indictment for first-degree CSC may be found and filed at any time; other offenses have set periods, changed for second- and third-degree CSC committed on or after April 2, 2025.[24][25][26] | Described in the Criminal Proceedings Benchbook as an affirmative, waivable, nonjurisdictional defense; factual disputes are questions for a jury.[27][28] | The limitations defense |
| The accused's own intoxication | Rejected by statute for voluntarily and knowingly consumed alcohol or drugs: "it is not a defense to any crime." The exception is an affirmative defense to a specific intent crime for a legally obtained and properly used medication or other substance.[8] | For the exception, the defendant's burden by a preponderance of the evidence.[8] | Intoxication of the accused |
| Marriage to the complainant | A person may be charged and convicted even though the victim is his or her legal spouse, but not solely because the spouse is mentally incapable.[29] | Rejected by statute, with the one limit stated.[29] | Sex crime myths |
| "There was no real child" (sting cases) | Rejected in People v Thousand (Michigan Supreme Court, 2001): the nonexistence of a minor victim did not give rise to a viable defense to the attempt charge in that case.[30] | The Court held the circuit court erred in dismissing that charge on the basis of "legal impossibility."[30] | Online sting operations |
How is a "defense" different from holding the prosecutor to the burden?
Some of what is called a defense is a claim that the prosecutor has not proved an element. The jury instruction on the burden of proof, which must be given in every case, tells jurors the defendant is not required to prove innocence or to do anything.[1] Identity is an example: jurors are told the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was actually there when the alleged crime was committed.[20]
Other defenses add something the defense has to raise or prove. A note to the burden-of-proof instruction says that for some affirmative defenses a defendant must produce evidence.[9] Consent is described in its instruction's Use Note as an affirmative defense, and the Use Note says the instruction should be given only where there is evidence of consent.[12]
Entrapment is different again. The Michigan Supreme Court describes it as an issue irrelevant to guilt or innocence, decided by the trial judge on evidence presented outside the jury's presence.[6][7]
Which defenses do Michigan authorities reject or restrict?
- Consent of a person under 16 (rejected). The benchbook states that because a person under the age of 16 is legally incapable of consenting to a sexual act, consent is inapplicable for all CSC offenses involving victims under 16.[3]
- Consent where the offense requires proof of incapacity (rejected). The benchbook states that a victim who is mentally incapable, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless is presumed legally incapable of consent under the CSC Act.[4] Whether the condition existed can be disputed.[12]
- Consent of a mental health professional's client (rejected by statute). For the fourth-degree provision on mental health professionals, the statute says the consent of the victim is not a defense.[10]
- Mistake of age (rejected). In People v Cash the Michigan Supreme Court said the actual, and not the apparent, age of the complainant governs in statutory rape offenses.[14]
- Close-in-age, or "Romeo and Juliet" (rejected as a defense to the charge). The Court of Appeals has said that if the Legislature had intended courts to consider the age differential between the two people, it could have included that in the CSC statutes.[31] An age-gap element does appear in one fourth-degree provision, where the actor is 5 or more years older than a person aged 13 to 15.[32]
- Lack of corroboration or resistance (not required by statute). In prosecutions under MCL 750.520b to 750.520g, the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated, and a victim need not resist the actor.[33][34]
- Voluntary intoxication (rejected by statute, with one exception). It is not a defense to any crime that the defendant was under the influence of or impaired by a voluntarily and knowingly consumed alcoholic liquor, drug or other substance; the exception is the medication defense to a specific intent crime.[8]
Evidence and notice rules covered elsewhere in this guide
Three sets of rules bear on the defenses above and have their own pages.
- The rape-shield statute. In prosecutions under MCL 750.520b to 750.520g, evidence of the victim's sexual conduct is not admitted except in two listed categories and on findings by the judge, and a defendant who proposes to offer either files a written motion and offer of proof within 10 days after the arraignment on the information.[19][35][36] In People v Hackett the Michigan Supreme Court recognized that in certain limited situations admission of such evidence may be required to preserve the right to confrontation, and also said courts should always favor exclusion where exclusion would not unconstitutionally abridge that right.[37][38] See Michigan's rape-shield law.
- Other-acts evidence. In a case charging a listed offense against a minor, evidence that the defendant committed another listed offense against a minor is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.[39] See Other-acts evidence.
- Notice rules. In a felony case alibi testimony requires written notice, and under MCR 6.201(B) a defendant who intends to introduce expert evidence of mental illness or intellectual disability bearing on specific intent gives written notice not less than 30 days before the trial date, or at such other time as the court directs.[21][40]
Claims that are not defenses
A polygraph. A defendant alleged to have committed first- through fourth-degree CSC or assault with intent to commit CSC shall be given a polygraph examination if the defendant requests it.[41] Testimony concerning a defendant's polygraph examination is not admissible in a criminal prosecution.[42] See Polygraph tests in CSC cases.
The complainant no longer wants to proceed. The Court of Appeals has said a crime victim may not determine whether the prosecution of a crime goes forward or is dismissed.[43] In People v Morrow, where a complainant had given two accounts, the court said it is the province of the jury to determine which is the truth.[44]
Being charged twice for one incident. Double jeopardy protects against a second prosecution after acquittal or conviction and against multiple punishments for the same offense.[45] The Court of Appeals has held that convictions of both first- and second-degree CSC on the same facts do not violate double jeopardy; the Michigan Supreme Court has said that one act of penetration accompanied by more than one aggravating circumstance may give rise to only one criminal charge for purposes of trial, conviction, and sentencing.[46][47]
What people get wrong
"A reasonable mistake about age is a defense." The Michigan Supreme Court rejected a reasonable-mistake-of-age defense in People v Cash.[5]
"The jury decides entrapment." The trial judge decides it.[7]
"Consent is always a defense." The benchbook states that consent is inapplicable for all CSC offenses involving victims under 16.[3] The sentencing consequences that make these questions matter are set out in the CSC penalties chart.
Common questions
Does a person accused of CSC have to prove anything?
Not as to the elements of the charge. The model instruction given in every case tells jurors the prosecutor must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant is not required to prove innocence or to do anything.[1] A note to that instruction says that for some affirmative defenses a defendant must produce evidence.[9] Two defenses put the burden of proof on the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence: entrapment, decided by the judge, and the statutory medication defense to a specific intent crime.[6][8]
Is consent always a defense to criminal sexual conduct?
No. The Court of Appeals has said consent can be utilized as a defense to negate the elements of force or coercion.[2] The benchbook for judges states it is inapplicable to all CSC offenses involving victims under the age of 16, and to offenses that require proof that the victim was mentally incapable, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.[3][4] For charges defined by a complainant aged 16 or older and the actor's position, such as school staff, the sources state the elements but no rule on consent.[11]
Is it a defense that I did not know the person's age?
Not in the cases the sources describe. Michigan does not recognize a reasonable-mistake-of-age defense in cases of statutory rape; in People v Cash the complainant was 15 and had said she was 17.[5] The Court contrasted provisions where the Legislature added the words "knows or has reason to know" of the victim's condition.[14]
Is it a defense that the charge is very old?
It depends on the offense and the dates. Under the current statute an indictment for first-degree CSC may be found and filed at any time, though the Court of Appeals has held that the 2001 extension could not revive a charge whose period had already run.[24][48] Other offenses have limitation periods, and the Criminal Proceedings Benchbook describes the limitations defense as affirmative, waivable and nonjurisdictional.[25][27]
Does passing a polygraph end the case?
No source used here says so. The statute says a defendant alleged to have committed a crime under MCL 750.520b to 750.520e or 750.520g shall be given a polygraph examination if the defendant requests it.[41] Testimony concerning a defendant's polygraph examination is not admissible in a criminal prosecution.[42]
Sources
- M Crim JI 3.2 — Michigan Courts
- People v Waltonen, 272 Mich App 678, 689 (2006); People v Jansson, 116 Mich App 674, 682-683 (1982) — Michigan Courts
- People v Starks, 473 Mich 227, 235 (2005); People v Cash, 419 Mich 230, 247-248 (1984) — Michigan Courts
- MJI Sexual Assault Benchbook (3d ed) §4.1(B)(2)–(3); MCL 750.520e(1)(e) — Michigan Courts
- People v Cash, 419 Mich 230, 240-241 (1984) — Michigan Courts
- People v Jade, ___ Mich ___ (2026); People v D'Angelo, 401 Mich 167, 177-180, 183 (1977) — Michigan Courts
- People v Jade, ___ Mich ___ (2026), slip op at 19, citing People v D'Angelo, 401 Mich 167, 177-178 (1977) — Michigan Courts
- MCL 768.37(1), (2), (3)(b); Compiler's Notes — Michigan Legislature
- M Crim JI 3.2(2) and Use Note — Michigan Courts
- MCL 750.520e(1)(e) — Michigan Legislature
- MJI Sexual Assault Benchbook (3d ed) § 4.1(B)(1)-(3) — Michigan Courts
- M Crim JI 20.27 and Use Note — Michigan Courts
- People v Thompson, 117 Mich App 522, 528 (1982); People v Jansson, 116 Mich App 674, 682-683 (1982) — Michigan Courts
- People v Cash, 419 Mich 230, 241 (1984); People v Gengels, 218 Mich 632, 641 (1922), as quoted in Sexual Assault Benchbook § 4.2(B) — Michigan Courts
- MJI Sexual Assault Benchbook (3d ed) § 4.2(A)-(B), citing People v Gengels, 218 Mich 632, 641 (1922); In re Hildebrant, 216 Mich App 384, 386 (1996); People v Davis, 102 Mich App 403, 406-407 (1980) — Michigan Courts
- People v Davis, 102 Mich App 403, 406-407 (1980); People v Baker, 157 Mich App 613, 614-615 (1986) — Michigan Courts
- People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 182-183 (2016), quoting People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 643-644 (1998) — Michigan Courts
- MRE 607 — Michigan Courts
- MCL 750.520j(1) — Michigan Legislature
- M Crim JI 7.4; M Crim JI 7.8 — Michigan Courts
- MCL 768.20(1) — Michigan Legislature
- People v Jade, ___ Mich ___ (2026) (Docket No. 167920), slip op at 23, quoting People v Johnson, 466 Mich 491, 498 (2002) — Michigan Courts
- People v Jade, ___ Mich ___ (2026) (Docket No. 167920), slip op at 2 — Michigan Courts
- MCL 767.24(1)(a) — Michigan Legislature
- MCL 767.24(4)(a), (13); 2024 PA 268 — Michigan Legislature
- MCL 767.24(3)(a) — Michigan Legislature
- People v Bulger, 462 Mich 495, 517 n 7 (2000); People v Burns, 250 Mich App 436, 440, 444-445 (2002); People v Allen, 192 Mich App 592, 600 (1992), as stated in MJI Criminal Proceedings Benchbook, Vol. 1, § 6.4 — Michigan Courts
- People v Artman, 218 Mich App 236, 239 (1996); People v Wade, ___ Mich App ___ (2025), as described in MJI Criminal Proceedings Benchbook, Vol. 1, § 10.9(B)-(D) — Michigan Courts
- MCL 750.520l — Michigan Legislature
- People v Thousand, 465 Mich 149, 153, 165-166 (2001) — Michigan Courts
- MCL 750.520d(1)(a); MCL 750.520e(1)(a); In re Hildebrant, 216 Mich App 384, 386-387 (1996) — Michigan Courts
- MCL 750.520e(1)(a) — Michigan Legislature
- MCL 750.520h — Michigan Legislature
- MCL 750.520i; M Crim JI 20.26 — Michigan Legislature
- MCL 750.520j(1)(a)-(b) — Michigan Legislature
- MCL 750.520j(2) — Michigan Legislature
- People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 348 (1984) — Michigan Courts
- People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 349, 350-351 (1984), as quoted in MJI Sexual Assault Benchbook (3d ed) § 6.2(G), § 6.12(A) — Michigan Courts
- MCL 768.27a(1), (2) — Michigan Legislature
- MCR 6.201(B); People v Madison, ___ Mich ___ (2026) — Michigan Courts
- MCL 776.21(5) — Michigan Legislature
- People v Kahley, 277 Mich App 182, 183 (2007) — Michigan Courts
- People v Williams, 244 Mich App 249, 251, 254 (2001); People v Morrow, 214 Mich App 158, 165 (1995) — Michigan Courts
- People v Morrow, 214 Mich App 158, 165 (1995) — Michigan Courts
- People v Ford, 262 Mich App 443, 447 (2004); Const 1963, art 1, § 15 — Michigan Courts
- People v Duenaz, 306 Mich App 85, 107, 115 (2014); People v Garland, 286 Mich App 1, 5-6 (2009) — Michigan Courts
- People v Johnson, 406 Mich 320, 331 (1979); People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583, 601 (2000) — Michigan Courts
- People v Blackmer, 309 Mich App 199, 201 (2015); 2001 PA 6, as described in Sexual Assault Benchbook § 2.2(C) n 19 — Michigan Courts
This page is general legal information about Michigan law, published by the office of Attorney Shawn Haff. It is not legal advice and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws change and every case turns on its own facts — check the sources linked above and talk to a licensed Michigan attorney about your situation. If you are in danger, call 911. The National Sexual Assault Hotline is 1-800-656-4673.