Key points
- MCL 768.27c is a statutory exception to the hearsay rule for a statement that narrates, describes or explains the infliction or threat of physical injury on the person making it.[1]
- Five conditions all have to be met, including that the statement was made to a law enforcement officer, at or near the time of the injury or threat, under circumstances that indicate trustworthiness.[2]
- The person who made the statement does not have to be unavailable for it to be admitted.[3]
- The prosecuting attorney must disclose the evidence to the defendant not less than 15 days before the scheduled date of trial, unless the court allows later disclosure for good cause.[4]
- The statute was amended effective April 2, 2025, and now includes a broad definition of "infliction or threat of physical injury."[5]
MCL 768.27c is a Michigan statute that lets a court admit, as evidence, a statement a person made to a law enforcement officer describing an injury or a threat of injury to that person. It is an exception to the hearsay rule.[1] It applies only if five conditions are met, the prosecutor must give advance notice, and it does not override the constitutional right to confront witnesses.[2][4][6]
Without a rule like this, an officer generally could not repeat in court what someone said at the scene, because hearsay is not admissible unless the rules provide otherwise.[7]
The five requirements
Under MCL 768.27c(1), evidence of a statement is admissible if all of the following apply:[2]
- Subject. The statement purports to narrate, describe, or explain the infliction or threat of physical injury upon the declarant. "Declarant" is the legal term for the person who made the statement.[2]
- Type of case. The action is an offense involving domestic violence, or a violation of the prostitution or human trafficking chapters of the Michigan Penal Code.[2]
- Timing. The statement was made at or near the time of the infliction or threat of physical injury.[2]
- Trustworthiness. The statement was made under circumstances that would indicate its trustworthiness.[2]
- Audience. The statement was made to a law enforcement officer.[2]
Each condition narrows the rule. A statement to a neighbor, a relative or a nurse is outside this statute because it was not made to a law enforcement officer, though another hearsay exception might apply.[2] The first requirement speaks of injury or threat "upon the declarant."[2] How that wording fits with the definition added in 2025, which refers to harm to "any individual," is not settled in the sources this guide relies on.[5]
What changed on April 2, 2025
MCL 768.27c was added in 2006 and amended by 2024 PA 183, effective April 2, 2025.[8] Two features of the current text are worth knowing as of October 2026.
First, the statute is no longer limited to domestic violence prosecutions. Subsection (1)(b) covers an offense involving domestic violence and also violations of the penal code chapters on prostitution and human trafficking.[2] The 2026 edition of the Domestic Violence Benchbook still prints subsection (1)(b) in its earlier form, naming only an offense involving domestic violence, although its own summary describes the wider scope.[8] Where a secondary source and the statute differ, the statute controls.
Second, since April 2, 2025 the statute defines "infliction or threat of physical injury." The phrase includes physically harming or restraining any individual; threatening to harm or physically restrain any individual, or creating a scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause an individual to believe that failure to perform an act would result in physical, psychological, reputational, or financial harm; and facilitating or controlling an individual's access to a controlled substance other than for a legitimate medical purpose.[5] The first requirement still calls for a statement about injury or threat "upon the declarant."[2]
What "domestic violence" means in this statute
The statute has its own definition, and it is wider than the crime of domestic assault. An "offense involving domestic violence" means an occurrence of one or more of these acts, when not an act of self-defense: causing or attempting to cause physical or mental harm to a family or household member; placing a family or household member in fear of physical or mental harm; causing or attempting to cause involuntary sexual activity by force, threat of force, or duress; or engaging in activity that would cause a reasonable individual to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.[9]
A "family or household member" is a spouse or former spouse, an individual with whom the person resides or has resided, an individual with whom the person has or has had a child in common, or an individual with whom the person has or has had a dating relationship.[9] The relationship categories for the crime itself are discussed in Who is covered: the domestic relationship.
How close in time is "at or near"?
The statute does not give a number of minutes or hours. In People v Meissner, a complainant's oral and written statements to police described text messages that threatened physical injury, and the timing requirement was met because she made the statements at or very near the time she received one or more of the messages.[10]
There is one fixed outer limit. Evidence of a statement made more than 5 years before the filing of the current action is inadmissible under this section.[11]
How a judge assesses trustworthiness
For the trustworthiness requirement, the statute says relevant circumstances include, but are not limited to:[12]
- whether the statement was made in contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in which the declarant was interested;[12]
- whether the declarant has a bias or motive for fabricating the statement, and the extent of any bias or motive;[12]
- whether the statement is corroborated by evidence other than statements that are admissible only under this section.[12]
The Court of Appeals has described these as "a nonexclusive list of possible circumstances that may demonstrate trustworthiness," so a judge may consider others.[13]
The first factor is easy to misread. In Meissner the court explained that it pertains to litigation in which the declarant could gain a property, financial, or similar advantage, such as divorce, child custody, or tort litigation, and that it does not pertain to the victim's report of the charged offense.[14] In other words, the fact that a report to police may lead to a criminal case is not itself a mark against the statement. A separate pending family court case is the kind of circumstance the factor is about.
Corroboration commonly comes from the other evidence described in this guide: photographs and medical records, the 911 recording, and body camera video.
Notice: 15 days before trial
If the prosecuting attorney intends to offer evidence under MCL 768.27c, the prosecutor must disclose the evidence, including the statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, to the defendant not less than 15 days before the scheduled date of trial, or at a later time as allowed by the court for good cause shown.[4]
This deadline is the same as the one for other-acts evidence under MCL 768.27b, and one day longer than the written-notice deadline in Rule 404(b).[15][16]
The witness does not have to be unavailable
Some hearsay exceptions apply only when the person who made the statement cannot be brought to court. This one does not. In People v Olney the Court of Appeals said MCL 768.27c "contains no requirement that the complainant-declarant be unavailable in order to admit evidence of a statement that otherwise satisfies the statutory requirements."[3]
The statute also applies before trial. It covers trials and evidentiary hearings commenced or in progress on or after May 1, 2006, and a preliminary examination is a type of evidentiary hearing.[17] That means an officer may be allowed to relate a qualifying statement at the preliminary examination in a felony case.
The Confrontation Clause still applies
MCL 768.27c is a rule about hearsay. It is not an exemption from the Sixth Amendment. The general principle, stated by the Court of Appeals, is that evidence that falls within a hearsay exception may still be inadmissible if it violates the Confrontation Clause.[18]
Under Crawford v Washington, where testimonial evidence is at issue, the Sixth Amendment demands unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.[19] Whether a statement to an officer is testimonial depends on the circumstances. Statements are nontestimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the questioning is to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency; they are testimonial when there is no ongoing emergency and the primary purpose is to establish past events potentially relevant to a later prosecution.[20] In Hammon v Indiana, a domestic case, statements given to officers at the scene after the incident was over were testimonial.[21]
Putting the two rules together:
| Situation | Hearsay rule | Confrontation Clause |
|---|---|---|
| The person who made the statement testifies at trial and can be cross-examined | MCL 768.27c can apply; unavailability is not required[3] | When the person appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints on the use of the earlier statement[22] |
| The person does not testify, and the statement was made to help police meet an ongoing emergency | MCL 768.27c can apply if its five conditions are met[2] | Nontestimonial under Davis v Washington[20] |
| The person does not testify, and the statement described past events after the emergency had ended | MCL 768.27c can apply if its five conditions are met[2] | Testimonial; usable only if the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine[21][19] |
A defendant can lose the confrontation objection through his or her own conduct. A statement may be used against a party that wrongfully caused or encouraged the witness's unavailability and did so intending that result, and when hearsay is properly admitted on that basis the confrontation right is treated as waived.[23][24] The full framework is in Hearsay and the right to confront your accuser.
Privileges are not overridden
The statute says that nothing in it "shall be construed to abrogate any privilege conferred by law."[25] In a prosecution growing out of a wrong done by one spouse to the other, however, the spousal privilege does not apply to begin with.[26] See Spousal privilege in Michigan.
What people get wrong
"Anything said to the police comes in." The statute has five conditions, a five-year cut-off and a notice requirement, and a testimonial statement from a witness who does not testify still faces the confrontation analysis.[2][11][4][19]
"If the complaining witness takes it back, the statement is gone." The statute has no unavailability requirement, so a qualifying statement can be offered even when the person who made it testifies differently.[3] How an earlier statement is used against later testimony is covered in Recanting: when the accuser changes the story.
"Without the witness there is no case." A statement admitted under this statute is one of several kinds of evidence a prosecutor may rely on.[27] See When the victim does not come to court and What evidence is used in a domestic violence case.
Common questions
Can the prosecutor use what the complaining witness told police if that person does not testify?
Under the hearsay rules, possibly: MCL 768.27c contains no requirement that the person be unavailable.[3] But a hearsay exception does not settle the constitutional question. A testimonial statement of a witness who does not testify may be used against a defendant only if the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.[19]
Does MCL 768.27c apply to a statement made days after the incident?
The statute requires that the statement was made at or near the time of the infliction or threat of physical injury.[2] It does not define "near." In People v Meissner, statements describing threatening text messages qualified because they were made at or very near the time the complainant received one or more of the messages.[10] A statement made more than 5 years before the case was filed is inadmissible under this section.[11]
What makes a statement to police "trustworthy" under the statute?
The statute lists circumstances a court may weigh: whether the statement was made in contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in which the speaker was interested, whether the speaker has a bias or motive for fabricating, and whether the statement is corroborated by other evidence.[12] The Court of Appeals has called this a nonexclusive list.[13]
Does a pending divorce or custody case affect whether the statement comes in?
It can be argued as a trustworthiness factor. In People v Meissner the Court of Appeals said the "pending or anticipated litigation" factor pertains to litigation in which the speaker could gain a property, financial or similar advantage, such as divorce, child custody or tort litigation. It does not pertain to the report of the charged offense itself.[14]
Can MCL 768.27c be used at a preliminary examination?
Yes. The statute applies to trials and evidentiary hearings, and the Court of Appeals held in People v Olney (On Remand) that a preliminary examination is a type of evidentiary hearing to which it applies.[17] The Michigan Rules of Evidence govern a preliminary examination.[28]
Sources
- MCL 768.27c(1)(a) — Michigan Legislature
- MCL 768.27c(1)(a)-(e) — Michigan Legislature
- People v Olney, 327 Mich App 319, 326 (2019) — Michigan Judicial Institute, Domestic Violence Benchbook
- MCL 768.27c(3) — Michigan Legislature
- MCL 768.27c(5)(d) — Michigan Legislature
- People v Dendel (On Second Remand), 289 Mich App 445, 472 (2010) — Michigan Judicial Institute, Domestic Violence Benchbook
- MRE 801(c); MRE 802 — Michigan Courts
- MCL 768.27c (History); MJI Domestic Violence Benchbook §4.2(A)(2) — Michigan Legislature
- MCL 768.27c(5)(a)-(c) — Michigan Legislature
- People v Meissner, 294 Mich App 438, 446-447 (2011) — Michigan Judicial Institute, Domestic Violence Benchbook
- MCL 768.27c(1)(c) — Michigan Legislature
- MCL 768.27c(2)(a)-(c) — Michigan Legislature
- People v Meissner, 294 Mich App 438, 448-449 (2011) — Michigan Judicial Institute, Domestic Violence Benchbook
- People v Meissner, 294 Mich App 438, 450 (2011) — Michigan Judicial Institute, Domestic Violence Benchbook
- MCL 768.27b(2) — Michigan Legislature
- MRE 404(b)(3) — Michigan Courts
- People v Olney (On Remand), 333 Mich App 575, 587 (2020); MCL 768.27c(6) — Michigan Judicial Institute, Domestic Violence Benchbook
- People v Dendel (On Second Remand), 289 Mich App 445, 472 (2010); Davis v Washington, 547 US 813 (2006) — Michigan Judicial Institute, Domestic Violence Benchbook
- Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 68 (2004) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 822 (2006) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- Hammon v Indiana, decided with Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 826-832 (2006) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 59 & n 9 (2004) — Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School
- MRE 804(b)(6) — Michigan Courts
- People v Jones (Kyle), 270 Mich App 208, 212-214 (2006) — Michigan Judicial Institute, Domestic Violence Benchbook
- MCL 768.27c(4) — Michigan Legislature
- MCL 600.2162(3)(c), (d) — Michigan Legislature
- MCL 768.27c; MRE 803(1), (2), (5), (6); MRE 804(b)(1), (6) — Michigan Judicial Institute, Domestic Violence Benchbook
- MCR 6.110(A), (C) — Michigan Courts
This page is general legal information about Michigan law, published by the office of Attorney Shawn Haff. It is not legal advice and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws change and every case turns on its own facts — check the sources linked above and talk to a licensed Michigan attorney about your situation. If you are in danger, call 911. The National Domestic Violence Hotline is 1-800-799-7233.